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1PATENTS FOR INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
AFTER GRANT v COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS - PART 2
BEN MCENIERY*
ABSTRACT
An issue currently attracting attention in a number of jurisdictions is the patentability 
of ‘pure’ business methods, being methods of operating an aspect of a commercial 
enterprise which do not involve a physical aspect. This issue was dealt with recently 
in Australia by the Full Court of the Federal Court which considered the patentability 
of a method of protecting an asset from the claims of creditors. The court held that in 
order to be patentable, an invention must disclose a physically-observable effect and 
accordingly ordered that the patent be revoked.
I INTRODUCTION
The question of whether an invention must disclose a physically-observable effect to 
be patentable arose recently in Australia in Grant v Commissioner of Patents.1 Mr 
Grant’s invention is a ‘pure’ business method. It is described as an asset protection 
method and is a legal structure designed to allow a person to protect an asset from the 
claims of creditors. It involves creating a trust, the person making a gift of money to 
the trust, the trustee lending a sum of money to the person, and the trustee securing 
the loan by taking a charge over the asset. The aim of the method is that the trustee, 
by virtue of having taken a charge over the asset, would thereby have priority over 
other creditors of the person in whose favour debts may arise later in time. This is a
patent that involves reserving to one individual the exclusive right to apply certain 
aspects of the law in a particular way to achieve a useful result.
After an examination hearing, the Deputy Commissioner of Patents revoked the patent 
holding that the invention is not patentable subject matter. This decision was upheld 
on appeal by Branson J, a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia. A further 
appeal was brought by Mr Grant before the Full Court of the Federal Court. In a 
controversial decision, the Full Court unanimously rejected the appeal on the ground
that the invention does not disclose a physical aspect.
In part 1 it was argued, after considering the High Court of Australia’s watershed 
decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents2
(‘NRDC’) and the cases that followed, that there is no requirement in Australian law 
that inventions disclose a physical aspect in order to be a ‘manner of manufacture’ 
and therefore patentable subject matter. Therefore, it was suggested that an intangible 
invention would not automatically be excluded from patentability.
Following this line of argument, in part 2 it is suggested that Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents was not correctly decided. The approaches of the Deputy Commissioner, 
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1 [2006] FCAFC 120.
2 [1959] HCA 67; (1959) 102 CLR 252. Australian judgments are available at www.austlii.edu.au.
2Branson J and the Full Court are examined, with particular attention being given to 
the Full Court’s decision. Finally, an outline of the possible approaches that the High 
Court of Australia might take in relation to the matter should Mr Grant obtain special 
leave to challenge the Federal Court’s decision on appeal is given.
II DECISION OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
The Deputy Commissioner of Patents revoked the patent having determined that it is 
not patentable subject matter.3 In reaching this decision, the Deputy Commissioner
purported to introduce a new test, that in order to be patentable, an invention must 
involve the application of a law of nature or the application of technology to 
implement the method of the invention. The Deputy Commissioner noted that the 
invention does not involve the application of a law of nature and referred to the 
history of the development of the concept of a manner of manufacture as having 
consistently involved either the discovery of laws of nature or the application of 
technology based on the laws of nature. He expressed concern that there might be no 
limits to what is patentable subject matter if such a test were not observed and 
revoked the patent on the basis that the invention does not disclose either of these 
elements.4
The Deputy Commissioner categorised the invention as a discovery that resides in the 
domain of legal law, being the pre-existing body of Australian law, and described the 
invention as a discovery that the effects of certain laws can be avoided by taking 
preventative measures in accordance with other laws.5 He took objection to the fact 
that a patent would cordon off the use of a method that takes advantage of certain 
elements of the law for the exclusive use of the patentee. He stated that such a method 
would not amount to an artificially created state of affairs because the law itself is 
already a state of affairs which has been created by Parliament and is present in the 
laws of Australia. He considered it inappropriate that monopolies could be granted 
over areas of the law, because the law is for the use by the populace at large and is not 
for the use of one individual to the exclusion of others.6
Lack of novelty was considered but dismissed, as the only documentary evidence of 
prior art anticipating the patent before the Deputy Commissioner fell within the 12 
month grace period and therefore would not invalidate the patent.7
It is useful to note at this point that the same Deputy Commissioner rendered a 
decision in another matter which involved a patent over a legal method, Re Peter 
Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd.8 This decision was handed down by the Deputy 
Commissioner after he revoked Mr Grant’s patent, but before Branson J delivered 
judgment in the Federal Court.
3 Stephen John Grant [2004] APO 11.
4 Stephen John Grant [2004] APO 11, [25] – [28].
5 Stephen John Grant [2004] APO 11, [4] – [5].
6 Stephen John Grant [2004] APO 11, [26] – [27].
7 Stephen John Grant [2004] APO 11, [10] – [15]. Under Australian law there is a 12 month grace 
period under which publication or use of an invention within 12 months before the filing date of a 
complete application will not invalidate the patent.
8 [2005] APO 24.
3The subject matter in that case was a method of releasing equity in real property using 
a reverse mortgage to provide security for and a means of repaying a loan. Once 
again, this is an invention making use of the laws of Australia and it has no physical 
aspect. With similar reasoning to that used in respect of Mr Grant’s application, the 
Deputy Commissioner revoked the patent on the grounds that it does not involve the 
application of ‘science and technology’ and that it does not involve the application of 
a law of nature.9 In support of this reasoning, the Deputy Commissioner sought to 
read into the NRDC decision a requirement that an invention requires the application 
of science and technology in order to be an artificial state of affairs, rather then 
merely requiring the involvement of human endeavour in any form.10
III ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
While he argued that his reasoning was supported by the decision in NRDC, the test 
the Deputy Commissioner sought to rely on has never been expressed in the case law 
in those terms. The NRDC decision does not mention a technology limitation, nor is it 
mentioned in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity,11 CCOM v Jiejing,12 or IBM v 
Commissioner of Patents.13 It may be that an historical analysis would reveal that only 
patents relating to the application of technology have been upheld as valid, but this 
observation does not necessarily create a requirement. Instead it was the Full Court 
that dealt properly with this issue when it said that to impose such a requirement 
would risk the kind of rigidity that the High Court in NRDC warned against.14 The
same argument would also apply to the Deputy Commissioner’s reasoning in Re Peter 
Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd.
It was also a mistake that the Deputy Commissioner sought to revoke the patent on 
the grounds that it could be categorised as a discovery that resides in the domain of 
legal law, being the pre-existing body of Australian law. This approach does not take 
into account the distinction between a discovery of what the law is on a particular 
point and an inventive scheme that is a practical application of that discovery. As with 
any other form of invention, there can be no inventiveness in a mere discovery, but a 
new practical application coupled with a mode of carrying it into effect will be 
patentable if it satisfies the criteria in section 18 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth).15 What 
was discovered was that the laws of Australia operate in a certain way. The innovative 
step taken was to devise a process by which the effects of certain laws be avoided by 
the pre-emptive taking of appropriate steps in accordance with other laws. It is the 
practical application of that discovery rather than the discovery that the law operates 
in a certain way that Mr Grant was seeking a monopoly in respect of.
As a matter of practice, it does not seem appropriate that the Deputy Commissioner 
reached the decision he did since such a decision was not open to him on a strict 
reading of the law. It is curious that someone in the position of the Deputy 
Commissioner of Patents would attempt to lay down a new test to restrict the scope of 
9 Re Peter Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd [2005] APO 24, [61] – [62].
10 Re Peter Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd [2005] APO 24, [36].
11 [2001] FCA 445.
12 (1994) 122 ALR 417.
13 (1991) 33 FCR 218.
14 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [35] – [38].
15 See Ranks Hovis McDougall Ltd's Application (1976) AOJP 3915.
4patentability, or would render a decision based on policy reasons. Surely the role of 
the Deputy Commissioner, being someone who exercises an administrative rather 
than a judicial function, is to apply the existing law and not engage in judicial
activism, especially when the courts have recognised that it is Parliament’s role to 
determine questions of policy in relation to what is patentable subject matter.
IV DECISION OF BRANSON J 
On appeal, Branson J, a single judge of Federal Court, upheld the decision of the 
Deputy Commissioner to revoke the patent, but gave rather different and controversial 
reasons which were largely ignored by both the judges and the parties on further 
appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court.
Her Honour stated that she did not need to reach a conclusion on the question of 
whether patent protection is available for an invention that lacks the application of 
science or technology, or consists of applying the law in a certain way.16 Accordingly, 
Her Honour did not consider the issue of whether an invention without a physical 
aspect is patentable subject matter and for that reason her decision can be dealt with 
briefly.
Instead Her Honour upheld the revocation for the reason that ‘the performance of the 
invention will not add to the economic wealth of Australia or otherwise benefit 
Australian society as a whole.’17 Her Honour considered that the only economic 
utility in the invention was to those whose assets were protected and possibly to their 
advisors. She stated that:
an invention should only enjoy the protection of a patent if the social cost of 
the resulting restrictions upon the use of the invention is counterbalanced by 
resulting social benefits. This principle is derived from the theoretical 
justification for the grant of a patent; that is, the assumed value of inventive 
ingenuity to the economy of the country.18
V ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF BRANSON J
With respect, Branson J’s decision is contrary to established principles and displays a 
misunderstanding of the objects of patent law. Her Honour’s decision can at best be 
seen as a well-intentioned, but misguided attempt to introduce a new requirement to 
the law to strike out what appears to be an undesirable type of patent.
Her Honour’s proposition was made in reliance on the following which she extracted 
from the High Court’s judgment in NRDC:
a process, to fall within the limits of patentability which the context of the 
Statute of Monopolies has supplied, must be one that offers some advantage 
which is material, in the sense that the process belongs to a useful art as 
16 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCA 1100, [19].
17 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCA 1100, [21].
18 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCA 1100, [20].
5distinct from a fine art – that its value to the country is in the field of economic 
endeavour.19 (citation omitted)
What the High Court was referring to was a value to the country in the field of 
economic endeavour, as opposed to a value to the country in some other field, such as 
artistic or intellectual endeavour. The words used by Branson J, ‘to the country as a 
whole’ simply do not appear in the High Court’s judgment and it is suggested that 
there is no basis for reading them into the passage Her Honour extracted.
The history of patent law would seem replete with inventions that would be of 
economic significance only to their inventor during the term of the patent. Further, 
Branson J’s argument ignores the fact that the method will be available to the country 
as a whole at the expiry of the patent when it falls into the public domain, or that the 
wider community may also benefit when an individual is granted a monopoly.
Finally, it must be asked, how could the patents office apply such a test? The Full 
Court dealt satisfactorily with this question when it said the courts are not in a 
position to balance the social cost and public benefits of an invention. The Full Court 
said that questions of this nature have already been resolved by the patent system 
which rewards innovation with a time-limited monopoly where the requirements of 
the Act are satisfied.20
VI DECISION OF THE FULL COURT
The Full Court of the Federal Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the decisions of 
the Deputy Commissioner and Branson J, but did so on different grounds.
The court categorised the invention as being a business method concerned with 
‘actions of financial and legal consequence’.21 Consistent with the expectation that 
patent law not discriminate between fields of technology, the court predictably stated 
that patent protection is afforded to any invention that complies with the requirements 
of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and that accordingly, business methods are not 
automatically excluded from the scope of patentable subject matter.22
The court considered whether the invention complies with the requirements of the 
Act, the most pressing being whether the invention is a manner of manufacture. In the 
most contentious aspect of its judgment, the court held that an invention must display 
a physical phenomenon or effect resulting from the working of a method for it to be a 
manner of manufacture. In the words of the court:
the method of his patent does not produce any artificial state of affairs, in the 
sense of a concrete, tangible, physical, or observable effect.23
A physical effect in the sense of a concrete effect or phenomenon or 
manifestation or transformation is required.24
19 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCA 1100, [20] citing NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275.
20 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [45].
21 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [2].
22 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [26].
23 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [30].
6It is necessary that there be some “useful product”, some physical 
phenomenon or effect resulting from the working of a method for it to be 
properly the subject of letters patent.25
The court only expressed the necessity as being a physicality requirement. It did not 
express it as a technicality requirement, a need for implementing or enabling 
technologies, or a requirement that the invention belong to the technological arts.
The approach the Full Court took was to ask whether the invention is a proper subject 
of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for the 
application of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. The court examined a line of 
cases dating back prior to the NRDC decision and observed that the patentability of an 
invention without a physical aspect has never been upheld. The court noted that in 
NRDC, an artificial effect was physically created on the land, and that in each of 
Welcome Real-Time v Catuity, CCOM v Jiejing and in the United States decisions of 
State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group26 and AT&T Corp v Excel 
Communications, Inc,27 there was a component physically affected or a change in 
state or information in a part of a device or machine. In contrast, the court regarded 
any method that does not produce a physical result as merely ‘intellectual 
information’ and a scheme which has never been patentable.28
The Full Court acknowledged that Heerey J in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity did not 
accept that a physically observable effect was necessarily required, although he held 
such an effect was present in the case before him. Their Honours took from 
Heerey J’s judgment that he had:
distinguished between an abstract idea, a method of calculation or a business 
method (in the sense of a particular method or scheme for carrying on 
business) which his Honour described as non-patentable and a claim to a 
method and device for use in business, that is a practical operation of an 
abstract idea. His Honour drew a distinction between a technological 
innovation which is patentable and a business innovation which is not.29
After distinguishing Mr Grant’s application from that considered in Welcome Real-
Time v Catuity the court upheld the decision that Mr Grant’s patent be revoked on the 
ground that it does not disclose a physical aspect and therefore is not patentable 
subject matter. In doing so, the court equated the lack of a physical aspect with Mr 
Grant’s process being a mere scheme or intellectual information, rather than an 
invention suitable to warrant the grant of letters patent.30
The court also addressed as a separate issue the question of whether methods of 
interpretation and application of the law to achieve a useful result are patentable. The 
24 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [32].
25 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [47].
26 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (denying certiorari).
27 172 F 3d 1352, 1356; 50 USPQ 2d 1447, 1450 (Fed Cir 1999).
28 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [14] - [23].
29 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [24].
30 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [32].
7court used the expression, ‘legal discoveries’ to describe this class of invention. It 
held that they are not patentable for two reasons. The first was that the interpretation 
and application of the law would not be considered as having, in the words of NRDC,
‘an industrial, commercial or trading character’, even though it is an area of economic 
importance. The court distinguished between an invention that has an industrial, 
commercial or trading character and one that is of economic importance. It indicated 
that a development, say for example in the fine arts, may be of economic importance, 
but that does not necessarily give it an industrial, commercial or trading character.31
Secondly, in a manner consistent with the reasoning of the Deputy Commissioner, the 
court classified all ingenuity and imagination which may produce new kinds of 
transactions, advices, schemes, or arguments as discoveries rather than inventions.
The court responded to an issue raised by the Deputy Commissioner in Re Peter 
Szabo and Associates Pty Ltd, who refused to award a patent on the grounds that the 
invention did not involve the application of science or technology. The court did not 
give an opinion as to whether there is a requirement that an invention be within the 
realm of science or technology in order to be patentable, but did express doubt that 
this would be the case. It said that to impose such a requirement would be to risk 
imposing the kind of rigidity that the High Court in NRDC warned against.32
The court dealt briefly with the issues of novelty and inventiveness. The court did not 
identify any documents that would anticipate the invention. It said that there is no 
suggestion of any novelty in the integers of the invention, being a trust, a gift, a loan 
and a charge over an asset.33 The court also described the combination of these 
integers as lacking novelty, rather than being a new combination.34
In relation to inventiveness, the court, citing NRDC and Commissioner of Patents v 
Microcell Ltd,35 said the invention is not the proper subject of letters patent because:
Assuming novelty, the proposed scheme represents a new use of known 
products (a trust, a gift, a loan and a security) with known properties for which 
their known properties make them suitable (the creation of a structure of 
financial rights and obligations or even a change in the person’s legal 
circumstances).36
What the court appears to have said is that the invention is a new use of known 
products with known properties for which their known properties make them suitable, 
therefore combining the elements in the way that Mr Grant has done is not inventive.
Finally, the Full Court discarded the contention of Branson J that an invention should 
only enjoy the protection of a patent if the social cost of the resulting restrictions upon 
the use of the invention is counterbalanced by resulting social benefits.37 The court 
held that it is not in a position to balance the social costs and public benefits of 
31 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [34].
32 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [35] - [38].
33 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [4].
34 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [39].
35 (1959) 102 CLR 232.
36 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [39].
37 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [43].
8granting monopoly rights in respect of an invention; and that questions of this nature 
have already been resolved by the patent system which rewards innovation with a 
time-limited monopoly where the requirements of the Act are satisfied.38
After the Federal Court’s decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, the Australian 
Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedures was revised to reflect the 
requirement laid down by the court that for a method to be patentable, the application 
or operation of the method must have a physical form, but that it does not necessarily 
require the application of science or technology.39
VII ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE FULL COURT
A Manner of manufacture – the physical aspect requirement
As discussed in part 1, it would appear to contradict the existing law, and in particular 
the NRDC decision, to suggest that the manner of manufacture test contains a 
requirement that an invention disclose a physical aspect to be patentable. While the 
Full Court’s observation that the patentability of an invention without a physical 
aspect has never been upheld may be accurate, this does not necessarily mean the 
courts have set down a rule that the absence of a physical aspect would render an 
invention unpatentable.
The course of the Full Court’s reasoning went from acknowledging that the High 
Court in NRDC left the question unresolved and that Heerey J in Welcome Real-Time 
v Catuity had been aware of but had not needed to decide the question, to holding that 
the law requires that an invention must contain a physical aspect to be patentable. The 
court did not give an explanation as to how it reached this conclusion and perhaps 
read into Heerey J’s judgment more than what he intended to say.
It would appear that the court equated a lack of a physical aspect with the invention 
being only a mere scheme or intellectual information. The concept of a mere scheme 
or plan for doing business is not an additional exclusion from patentability to the 
principles set out in the NRDC decision. While it may be a convenient way of 
indicating subject matter that is not patentable, the true scope of what is patentable 
subject matter must be determined by reference to the NRDC principles. The 
characteristic of a ‘mere’ scheme or plan is that it is a concept without any practical 
application or means of being put into effect. Equating a lack of a physical aspect with 
the invention being only a mere scheme or intellectual information would appear to be 
inconsistent with the NRDC principles because it ignores the possibility that an 
intangible method might produce a useful practical outcome.
In this regard, Mr Grant’s method clearly discloses a practical application and means 
of it being put into effect. The practical application inherent in Mr Grant’s invention 
is the protection of the assets of the person who uses the scheme from the claims of 
creditors. The fact that the invention does not disclose a physical aspect in no way 
causes this invention to lack a practical effect. 
38 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [45].
39 Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedures Volume 2 - National, para 2.9.2.10 
(‘Business Methods’).
9Given that the High Court warned against denying patentability to certain classes of 
invention because this would be inconsistent with leaving the manner of manufacture 
concept open to new forms of invention, it would not seem appropriate that the court 
impose this new requirement that an invention contain a physical aspect. This new 
requirement is an unnecessary and artificial fetter that is inconsistent with the manner 
of manufacture concept being able to adapt to unforeseen developments in 
technology. It may unfairly deny patentability to of intangible inventions which 
otherwise fit within the concept of a manner of manufacture. As such, it is suggested 
that the Full Court erred in imposing a physicality requirement and instead should 
have held that the invention is patentable subject matter.
That the Full Court did not give an opinion as to whether there is a requirement that 
an invention be within the realm of science or technology in order to be patentable
was a sensible approach for the court to take on the issue since it had already decided 
uphold the revocation on other grounds. However, it is significant that the court said 
that to impose such a requirement would risk imposing the kind of rigidity that the 
High Court in NRDC warned against. Surely the court should have recognised that the
approach it took is no different to the approach taken by the Deputy Commissioner, to 
strike a patent out because it lacked the application of science or technology. Both 
impose an artificial fetter on the law’s ability to accommodate inventions that have 
not yet been envisaged.
The Full Court’s failure to properly explain how it concluded that a physical aspect is 
required is an aspect of the decision that invites speculation. Perhaps it is possible that 
the court was uncomfortable with the nature of the invention or the consequences that 
would flow from allowing the patent, and rendered a decision on unspecified policy 
grounds to deny patentability. If this were the case, it would of course be inconsistent 
with the view expressed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Anaesthetic
Supplies Pty Limited v Rescare Limited40 that decisions of policy are to be resolved by 
Parliament rather than by the courts. In fact, the Full Court could have been instructed 
by its own words, which it used to reject Branson J’s suggestion that the economic 
utility of an invention need be for the benefit of the country as a whole. There, the 
court said:
Nor is the Court in a position to determine the balance between social cost and 
public benefit. Parliament has already made that judgment, as its predecessor 
did in 1623, by rewarding innovation with time-limited monopoly.41
B The patentability of ‘legal discoveries’
The court held that methods of using the law to achieve a particular result, or ‘legal 
discoveries’ as it described them, are not patentable, because it considered that they 
lack, in the words of NRDC, ‘an industrial, commercial or trading character’ and are 
discoveries rather than inventions.
The court conceded that the practice of law requires ingenuity and imagination, but 
did not explain why it would regard the use of ingenuity and imagination in legal 
40 (1994) 122 ALR 141.
41 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [45].
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practice as not being of a commercial character. This is difficult to understand as the 
practice of law is a profit-driven commercial enterprise. The law is largely a service-
based profession which people use as a means of generating wealth. Surely innovative 
developments in the way law is applied that achieve a useful result that is of economic 
significance are of a commercial character and therefore ought to be encouraged by 
the reward of the monopoly protection afforded by a patent.
Secondly, the court gave no explanation as to why it classified an advance in the field 
of legal affairs as a discovery. Like the Deputy Commissioner, it would seem that the 
court failed to recognise the distinction between a discovery of what the law is on a 
particular point and an inventive scheme that is a practical application of that 
discovery. While there can be no inventiveness in a mere discovery, a new practical 
application coupled with a mode of carrying it into effect will be patentable if it 
satisfies the criteria in section 18. Here it is the practical application of that discovery, 
rather than the discovery that the law operates in a certain way, that Mr Grant seeks a 
monopoly in respect of.
In any event, it is curious that the court would have undertaken an analysis of this 
nature and have made the statement that all innovations in the practice of law are not 
patentable, not just those that lack a physical aspect. The High Court in NRDC warned 
against denying patentability to certain classes of invention and the Full Court itself 
stated that it would not invalidate a patent merely because it is a business method.
Given this, it would seem inappropriate that the court denied that an invention is 
patentable merely because it is a legal method.
C Would the invention have been patentable if it had involved a computer?
According to the Full Court, one of the arguments raised by Mr Grant was that if the 
documents required to give effect to the process were produced by computer, the 
requirement that there be a physical phenomenon would be satisfied.42 This is an 
interesting argument that the court did not pursue.
It would appear that there are good reasons why Mr Grant did not claim the use of a 
computer as one of the integers of his patent. The first is that a computer is not really 
necessary to achieve the desired outcome. The second is that to do so would have 
severely limited the scope of the monopoly to one which would only cover the use of 
the method as implemented by a computer. What Mr Grant wanted was a monopoly 
to cover any use of his method. It would have been easy for a competitor to invent 
around the patent by simply using the method without making use of a computer in 
the manner specified by Mr Grant, or by not using a computer at all.
In any event, it is likely that a claim involving the use of a computer would not have 
been an essential integer of the invention, because the inventive element was in the 
structure of the transaction and would not reside in the involvement of a computer. 
This would leave only the intangible process to consider in an infringement action or 
challenge to the validity of the patent. So, even if Mr Grant had included the use of a 
computer in his invention, the court would have in all likelihood struck out the patent 
on the same grounds.
42 Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [28].
11
D Novelty and inventiveness
Common opinion seems to be that there must be many trusts using the same 
combination of elements that anticipate this invention, and that even if the 
combination were novel, it is unlikely that it would be inventive. The Full Court’s 
analysis corresponds with this view.
In reaching the view that it did, the court did not refer to section 101B which deals 
with examination of an innovation patent. Sub-section 101B(3) provides that for the 
purposes of an innovation patent, the prior art base ‘is to be taken not to include 
information made publicly available only through the doing of an act (whether in or 
out of the patent area)’ when determining whether the invention is novel and involves 
an innovative step. That is, prior art information used to demonstrate that the patent 
has been anticipated must be contained in documentary evidence.
Proving a lack of novelty in this situation can be problematic. The difficulties are that 
documents which anticipate a legal innovation are generally not made publicly 
available, often because there is no perceived benefit in publishing them or they are 
the subject of legal professional privilege. That the court did not identify any 
documentary evidence anticipating the patent makes it arguable that its revocation on 
the basis of a lack of novelty is open to challenge. 
VIII HOW THE FULL COURT SHOULD HAVE RESOLVED THE MANNER OF 
MANUFACTURE ISSUE
The Full Court should have adhered more closely to the existing principles set out in 
the NRDC decision. The first step in the court’s approach should have been to 
acknowledge that there is no established exception to patentability that renders an 
invention without a physical aspect unpatentable. The court then should have properly 
addressed the question of whether an exception can be established by applying the 
NRDC principles.
The High Court in NRDC said that the manner of manufacture test is to be applied 
flexibly and warned against the practice of denying patentability to certain classes of 
invention. It said that an invention must be a vendible product in the sense of it being 
an artificially-created state of affairs of economic significance and its value to the 
country must be in the field of economic endeavour. It must have an industrial, 
commercial or trading character. Further, it must offer some advantage that is material 
in the sense that it must be part of the ‘useful arts’ rather than the ‘fine arts’.43
It appears that Mr Grant’s invention meets these criteria. The asset protection method
is an artificially-created state of affairs, in that it is a man-made process that produces 
a useful and concrete result, being the protection of assets from the claims of 
creditors. It is of economic significance, is of value to the country in the field of 
economic endeavour and bears a commercial character because it is a process that a 
consumer would be willing to pay to have implemented on his or her behalf and it 
43 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275.
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provides a competitive advantage in the practice of law, or to other profit-driven 
commercial professional advisers charged with using the law to look after their 
clients’ assets. It is not just an abstract idea or plan; it is something that can be put 
into practice to produce a useful economic result. The useful material advantage that it 
offers is the benefit of asset protection to anyone who makes use of the scheme, which 
makes it part of the useful arts. That the invention has no ‘concrete, tangible, physical, 
or observable effect’ is irrelevant. 
It is not appropriate at this stage to consider the effectiveness of the scheme, that is, 
whether the application of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) would allow the scheme to 
achieve the inventor’s aims. The question of whether the method is effective is a 
question of utility and therefore is not to be considered when asking whether the 
invention is a manner of manufacture, as the heads identified in section 18 of the Act 
are to be considered separately.44
Accordingly, the result, which some may regard as unfortunate, is that according to 
existing principles, the invention should have been held to be a manner of 
manufacture and therefore properly the subject of letters patent. 
IX CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the Full Court’s decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents
is correct or desirable, it is now the case that in Australia the law requires that a 
method must disclose some physical aspect in the sense being of a concrete, tangible,
or observable effect or phenomenon or manifestation or transformation to be 
patentable. There is no need to show that the invention is for the economic benefit of 
Australia as a whole.
This means that pure business methods cannot be patented in Australia. The outcome 
is unsurprising, as historically, controversial subject matter, such as computer 
software, methods of medical treatment for humans and inventions for the creation of 
living micro-organisms met initial resistance, mainly in patent offices, before being
accepted as being suitable for the grant of a patent. What remains to be seen is 
whether the law in Australia in the future will bend to allow patents over the 
intangible ‘products’ that new technology will invariably thrust upon us or whether it 
will remain resilient.
This is an important issue, because having an effective test to determine the scope of 
what is patentable is of vital importance to the overall effectiveness of national 
economies. Determining whether patents without a physical aspect are deserving of 
patent protection is an important part of getting the balance of this test right, because 
the outcome will affect the incentive to innovate and the freedom of citizens to 
conduct business affairs. A patents system which allows monopoly protection of 
products or processes which are not deserving of that protection will adversely affect 
the public interest, as does one that does not fairly reward ingenuity.
44 Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 58, [43] – [46]; CCOM v 
Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 446.
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Given that few of us have a Jules Verne-like ability to predict what technological 
advances the future will bring, it is difficult to properly assess the impact of denying 
patentability to intangible inventions. As far as the immediate future is concerned, it 
would appear that if there were no physicality requirement imposed by patent law it 
would be possible that we would be faced with patents over novel and inventive 
financial or legal arrangements, tax minimisation schemes, methods of treatment of 
humans that do not involve any physical effect (such as methods of psychological 
treatment), education and training programmes, contractual commercial arrangements, 
ways of encrypting and decrypting information (without reference to a physical 
device, such as a computer), and other non-trivial multi-step processes.
It may be that in a ‘post-industrial’ world, the requirement for a technical 
implementation or physicality requirement is a ‘meaningless relic from a bygone 
age’45 and that these are the types of invention that we should be encouraging by the 
grant of a monopoly. Alternatively, it could be the case that granting patents of this 
nature will stifle innovation in the service-dominated forms our economies are 
moving towards. 
Should Mr Grant obtain special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia to 
challenge the Federal Court’s decision, ideally, the High Court would invalidate the 
patent on the grounds of a lack of novelty and innovative step, but hold that there is 
no physicality requirement and that the invention is patentable subject matter. The 
advantage of this approach is that it would be consistent with the broad and flexible 
approach the court espoused in NRDC.
High Court might reconsider its decision in NRDC and declare that there are 
particular restrictions that should be placed on the manner of manufacture test and 
introduce a practice of denying that some certain classes of invention are patentable. 
While it is unlikely to uphold the requirement that an invention must disclose a 
physical aspect, the High Court might choose to break from established precedent and 
take on a policy role, rather than leaving policy issues solely to be resolved by 
Parliament. In the unlikely event that it were to invalidate the patent on policy 
grounds, it would probably do so on the basis that the invention is a method making 
use of the laws of Australia for the use of one individual to the exclusion of others, 
being the reasons raised by the Deputy Commissioner.
Alternatively, the High Court might seek to invalidate the patent on the grounds that 
the invention lacks industrial applicability. Although this is not a requirement that has 
been explicitly laid out by the courts, it is seemingly more consistent with the NRDC
principles than a physicality requirement. The essence of a decision on these grounds 
would be to draw a distinction between inventions bearing an industrial character and 
those having a purely commercial character. If it were to do so the High Court would 
need to reconsider its statement in NRDC that a process must have an ‘industrial or 
commercial or trading character’ by removing the reference to inventions that have a 
commercial character. This might be more consistent with the established body of 
case law and community expectations on the issue than a physicality requirement,
given that traditional notions of what is patentable lie in the industrial sphere.
45 William van Caenegem, ‘The technicality requirement, patent scope and patentable subject matter in 
Australia’ (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 41, 52 – 53. 
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Other than the High Court reconsidering the approach in NRDC, the way to combat 
intangible patents in Australia is to lobby Parliament to recast the test for 
patentability. One way of doing this would be to remove the archaic manner of 
manufacture test and replacing it with a test that has specific exclusions similar to 
article 52 of the European Patent Convention. Parliament then could address in the 
legislation the question of whether an intangible invention is patentable. This, 
however, is unlikely, as Parliament seems content to leave the task of determining the 
scope of what is patentable subject matter to the courts.
Regardless, of whether the Full Court’s new physicality requirement remains, Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents has been a landmark case in the area of patent law involving 
an issue that is being considered in a number of jurisdictions. It has shown that the 
supposedly flexible and deliberately vague Australian approach to patentability does 
not deliver immediate certainty when new developments test the limits of 
patentability. What remains to be seen is whether the patent system can adapt 
appropriately to this new type of patent application.
